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ABSTRACT
To believe that every single scientist ought to be individually
engaged in ethical thinking in order for science to be responsible
at a collective level may be too demanding, if not plainly
unrealistic. In fact, ethical labor is typically distributed across
different kinds of scientists within the scientific community. Based
on the empirical data collected within the Horizon 2020 ‘RRI-
Practice’ project, we propose a classification of the members of
the scientific community depending on their engagement in this
collective activity. Our classification offers, on the one hand, a
model of how the ethical aspects of science are taken into
consideration by scientists and, on the other, some indications on
how to institutionalize ethics in science.
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Science and technology have the power to shape the future and transform the world
we live in. Societal needs and common values evolve under their influence. Some
become completely or partly obsolescent, e.g. human face-to-face contact with the
invention of the telephone, or voice communication with the advent of instant messa-
ging. At the same time, new and often unexpected needs and values come to the fore-
front, e.g. preserving human genome intact from technological intervention. Ethical
thinking aims at making sense of these transformations. All people, in particular scien-
tists, are able to, and indeed often do, engage in ethical thinking either explicitly or
implicitly.
The transformative power of science and technology and their potential impact on
society are also addressed by various past and current governance approaches aimed at
institutionalizing ethics in research-performing organizations. They form a central, but
not the only, element of, e.g. Ethical, Legal and Social Implications (ELSI)1, Technology
Assessment (TA)2, or Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI).3 That the individual
ethical reflection is framed in such ways expands its scope to a collective and political
phenomenon in contemporary science. This phenomenon, based on an unceasing
tension between the individual reflection and the collective assignments of responsibility4,
is denoted in this article by the term ethical labor. Introduced by Nagel (1995) in the
broader context of the reconciliation of collective aims and individual standpoints
through the design of internally diversified institutions, ethical labor is used here, in
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contradistinction to ethical reflection, in order to emphasize the collective aspect of the
scientific institution.
As we will argue in Section 2, many of the current debates focus on the ethical problems
of the scientific enterprise in general but fail to address actual agents (i.e. scientists and
engineers) who are supposed to reflect upon and then solve such problems. This does
not help to clarify the difference between individual and collective dimension of
science. Following from there, we claim in Section 3 that ethical labor is distributed
unevenly across the scientific community, much in the same way as scientific knowledge
and expertise are not possessed in equal measure by every individual scientist. In Section 4,
we distinguish four different kinds of scientists on the basis of whether, and how much,
they engage in ethical thinking. By doing so we follow a virtue ethics approach: ethical
thinking is seen as a virtue by many but not all scientists, while the observers external
to science tend to believe that it is a universal value that should be equally desirable by
all. In section 5, we detail the connection between our classification and the wealth of
empirical data that inspired it, provided by the twelve national reports of the H2020
‘RRI-Practice’ project.5 We explain that the four types of scientists that we identify are
similar to the Weberian ‘ideal types’: although these model descriptions never fully corre-
spond to reality, they are inspired by empirical data and they can be used to comprehend
both data and reality. We also discuss methodological limitations and future prospects for
empirical studies of ethical thinking within the scientific community. This leads us, in
section 6, to several concluding remarks on how ethical reflection in science should be
institutionalized.
The moral responsibility of science and scientists’ ethical thinking
The relation between science and technology, on the one hand, and ethics, on the other, is
complex and multi-faceted. There exist multiple ways to address it. In philosophy of
science, for example, the relation between ethics and science is often discussed within
the debate on the so-called ‘value-free ideal’ of science. For the supporters of the value-
free ideal, non-epistemic (moral, social or political) values should have no role in the jus-
tification of scientific findings: the epistemic authority of science comes, and should come,
exclusively from its strive for objectivity and impartiality. The value-free ideal has been
endorsed by scientists and philosophers for a very long time. In the words of Henri
Poincaré,
Ethics and science have their own domains, which touch but do not interpenetrate. The one
shows us to what goal we should aspire, the other, given the goal, teaches us how to attain it.
So they never conflict since they never meet. (Poincaré [1920] 1958, 12)
However, numerous philosophers and STS scholars argue that moral and political
values are constitutive of the scientific activity: science is value-laden. Supporters of the
value-ladenness thesis argue that, if science is to preserve its authority, then it must be
responsible and, therefore, driven by ethical values.6
The debate about the role of non-epistemic values in science can surely provide sugges-
tive insights for a better conceptualization of the idea of responsible science. Such a debate,
however, seems to be mainly concerned with the specification of different kinds of non-
epistemic values, and with how or to what extent such values may drive science. The
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problem of finding out who or how many, within the scientific community, are driven by
such values is rarely considered. This is also the case for those philosophers who attempt a
less ‘disembodied’ approach such as, for example, Douglas (2003, 2009). In her view, apart
from conducting research for epistemic reasons, scientists also have the moral obligation
of considering the potential impact of their work in society. Such a moral obligation is not
something which is added over and above the normal scientific work: following some of
the early insights of Rudner (1953), Douglas holds that scientists qua scientists make value
judgments, especially in calculating the possible consequences of error. Thus she main-
tains that scientists are both epistemic and moral agents: there is no real separation
between the scientist-as-researcher and the scientist-as-advisor. Douglas also argues that
the only people possessing the necessary competence to consider potential errors and
their consequences are often scientists themselves. They are ‘reasonable’, as she says, in
the sense that they are capable of foreseeing and assessing the consequences of their
choices. We believe that this is a far-reaching idealization. Although Douglas’s work is
commendable for its attempt to bridge the gap between science and ethics, it seems
that the conclusion she draws is not entirely realistic.
This critique has already been expressed by Lefevere and Schliesser (2014), who also
criticise Douglas’model for one further reason. They believe that characterizing the scien-
tific community as a benchmark for reasonable foreseeability, as Douglas does, contains
the risk of uncritical self-affirmation. Similarly to Kuhn ([1962] 1996), Lefevere and
Schliesser demonstrate how research in mature sciences is often conducted in the light
of a dominant paradigm and without considering potentially valid alternatives. Pluralism
in science, they claim, is not only epistemically fruitful but also morally desirable. Douglas
introduces an ideal ‘reasonable person’ who ‘represents an objective standard to measure
the actions of a real person against’ and she also argues that every single scientist is both an
epistemic and an ethical agent. By contrast, Lefevere and Schliesser claim that, although
scientific pluralism reinforces the collective responsibility of science, not every single
scientist needs to be a pluralist. In their view, only those working on research policies
ought to be engaged with ethical thinking. Despite their criticisms, Lefevere and Schliesser
agree with Douglas on one important point: ‘It should still be scientists who judge scien-
tific claims’. They remain silent on whether the people potentially affected by a policy
decision should be included in the broader policy discussion.
Even though we endorse the critical points raised by Lefevere and Schliesser, we should
also highlight some limitations of their position. First, they argue that the self-legitimated
standards of a discipline should be questioned by looking for alternatives in the history of
that discipline. Some cutting-edge emerging disciplines, however, may be too young: their
history would not contain enough ‘suppressed alternative paradigms’. The assessment of
the potential impact of science and technology on society is a future-oriented activity:
ethical thinking should be supported by the knowledge of history, but history of science
alone remains insufficient for it.
Moreover, although Lefevere and Schliesser are quite right in their critique of Douglas’
idealized view of a ‘responsible scientist’, their own limitation of ethical thinking to scien-
tists working as policy-makers appears too restrictive. In fields such as genome editing, or
artificial intelligence ethical concerns are ubiquitous. Scientists working in these disci-
plines often find themselves engaged in ethical thinking or decision-making implicitly
or explicitly, even if they are not policy-makers.
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Is it correct, as Lefevere’s and Schliesser’s claim, that not every single scientist ought to
be engaged in ethical thinking? We submit that this is indeed the right position and we
therefore take up the structure of ethical labor in the scientific community.
The structure of scientific communities
During the last decades it has become commonplace to study scientific knowledge pro-
duction as a collective enterprise. Since no single individual scientist can possess all the
necessary knowledge and skills to make the advancement of science possible, many scholars
claim that the scientific community, with all its endemic diversity, is not only the locus but
also the agent of scientific knowledge production (Longino 1990, 2002; Solomon 2001).
Here we shall not open a debate on what exactly scientific knowledge is, how it is pro-
duced, and by whom it is possessed. For our purposes, it is enough to say that the collec-
tivist view on knowledge production has prompted several detailed descriptions of the
structure and function of the scientific community. In recent years, models of the so-
called ‘division of cognitive labor’ across the members of the scientific community have
been developed (Kitcher 1990; Strevens 2003; Weisberg and Muldoon 2009; DeLanghe
2014). In these models, the scientific community is characterized as being composed by
a mixture of different kinds of scientists: this endemic diversity allows science to accom-
plish its epistemic aims.
In a model proposed byWeisberg and Muldoon (2009), the scientific community is com-
posed of both ‘mavericks’ (scientists who tend to be more explorative and often pursue new
lines of research) and ‘followers’ (scientists who tend to expand on the original work pro-
duced by others). Weisberg and Muldoon argue that communities with a majority of fol-
lowers are too slow in discovering the epistemically significant parts of the ‘landscape of
science’. Communities with a majority of mavericks are much faster, but the mavericks’
sense of competition and desire of discovering new things would imperil further develop-
ment and application of new knowledge. Weisberg and Muldoon conclude that scientific
communities containing a good balance between mavericks and followers are the ones
that are best equipped to make progress. A number of recent works have extended or cri-
ticised this and similar models (Grim et al. 2013; McKenzie, Himmelreich, & Thompson,
2015; Thoma 2015; Pöyhönen 2017; Bedessem 2019; Hessen 2019; Avin 2019). Common
to all these works is the aim of understanding how different individual agents contribute
to the accomplishment of epistemic aims at the collective level.
We draw from this debate an inspiration for considering how ethical labor is carried on
and distributed across the scientific community. The ideal view of a solitary scientific
genius, while pleasant and poetical, is certainly unrealistic; the same is true about a solitary,
wise and superbly moral scientist. Individual variations in epistemic attitudes, cognitive
abilities and skills are beneficial for science and contribute to its overall cognitive labor.
We purport to extend this state of affairs to ethics in science. Science as a whole can be
responsible as a result of the scientists’ individual variations in their engagement with
ethical thinking. In other words, we argue that ethical labor, like cognitive labor, is distrib-
uted across the members of the scientific community.
To conclude this section, we note that the term ‘labor’ itself is philosophically charged.
For instance, Arendt (1958) distinguishes it from work and action. In her view, labor is an
activity carried on by individuals, which is necessary for their survival. Without delving
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into the philosophical depths of her view, it suffices to say that, unlike Arendt, we are
talking about ethical labor at a collective level. However, much like in Arendt’s categoriz-
ation, we submit that both cognitive and ethical labor are necessary for the survival of
science as a social institution.
Ethical thinking and the types of scientists
We present in this section a classification of scientists with regard to ethical labor and, in
the next section, we discuss its empirical foundation in the results of the project ‘Respon-
sible Research and Innovation in Practice’ (RRI-Practice). RRI is a science policy frame-
work which aims at achieving research and innovation outcomes that will influence
society in a sustainable and ethically desirable way (Von Schomberg 2013). It seeks to
engage science and technology stakeholders together with the public in a responsible,
multi-dimensional dialogue along five axes called ‘RRI keys’: ethics, science education,
open access, gender equality, and societal engagement.
Our classification follows a virtue ethics approach (Grinbaum and Groves 2013): we do
not assess whether scientists follow specific rules, as deontologists would, nor do we evalu-
ate the consequences of the scientists’ actions, as consequentialists would. We classify the
members of the scientific community in four categories: heroic scientists, Golem-makers,
Promethean scientists, and Faustian scientists, according to the values they implicitly or
explicitly possess or endorse.
Heroic scientists
Some scientists are merely unaware of the ethical issues surrounding the scientific activity.
They are to be found among the researchers who display unusual eagerness to work and,
overwhelmed by their own enthusiasm, rush to produce new knowledge or artifacts. They
consider research a struggling but ultimately rewarding and almost epic activity. Others
are located at the opposite end of spectrum: they are not interested in anything but execut-
ing the tasks given by their superiors and fulfilling the obligations assigned by their role.
We call both heroic scientists.Whether passionate or disaffected, they are like the heroes in
ancient Greek mythology: they operate through strength and determination. However,
heroic figures like Hercules or Perseus are not particularly wise or selfless. In contradis-
tinction to thoughtful characters like Nestor, Palamedes or Ulysses, who appear much
later in mythological time, these heroes rarely if ever have second thoughts. Change of
mind or repentance (metanoia) was for them a weakness prompt to be satirized (e.g.
Batrachomyomachia 70); it only began to be seen as a virtue at the time of Thucydides’s
account of the Peloponnesian War (3, 36) and, several centuries later, by the Judeo-Chris-
tian authors. Similarly, heroic scientists regard themselves as living simply in the pursuit of
scientific knowledge without being aware of the moral complexity of the world.
Heroic scientists are among those who implicitly endorse the value-free ideal: without
reflecting on the problem, they regard science as a purely epistemic enterprise. This endor-
sement of the value-free ideal may be reinforced by the institutional culture, e.g.:
A main barrier in ethics as a reflexive process is cultural and inter-organisational in nature. […]
As such, it is felt [by interviewed persons] as if ethical reflection is ‘out-sourced’ to a specific
programme, but it is not integrated throughout all the research activities. (Hahn et al. 2018)
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It is possible that such a barrier to ethical reflection may be overcome through education.
Some would argue, in fact, that the endorsement of the value-free ideal by heroic scientists
is a sheer consequence of their unawareness of the ethical implications of science, which in
turn depends on a lack of training. On this view, proper ethical education will take heroic
scientists out of this category. In this context, ethical education (which we equate with
training to think, in particular training to reflect upon one’s research activity) should
not be confused, not reduced to, practical training aimed at acquiring a particular set of
skills. Oftentimes, training is taken to be
about practice, about skill, about learning how to do things. Education is about fostering the
mind, by encouraging it to think independently and introducing it to knowledge of the phys-
ical and cultural world. It’s about theory, understanding and a sense of values. (Rickman
2004)
What many scientists receive is precisely such practical training reduced to giving out
general information about scientific integrity or the rules of conduct in a research insti-
tution. Scientific integrity, however, is not the same as the activity of thinking, especially
if it taught as a set of formal rules imposed in a top-down way. What is needed is a
different conception of what ethics training should consist of: a training to reflect upon
one’s work in a larger context. As recently argued by Mejlgaard et al. (2019), junior scien-
tists should be educated in order to provide them with the tools necessary for responsible
conduct under uncertainty and societal controversy. In other words, ethics training should
teach what Aristotle defined as phronesis: the virtue which allows to reflect upon how to
accomplish the ends necessary for the good life. Whether virtues can actually be taught is
open to debate, but even if they can, one of the problems with the scientists’ ethics training
is with following a teaching methodology that would take them out of the category of
heroic scientists.
Training in ethics can also be ineffective when organized through supplementary path-
ways such as online modules, off-the-clock briefing, or an occasional seminar. Again,
ethics presented through such pathways may result in a passive and uncritical learning
of formal rules without promoting individual reflection (Grinbaum and Politi 2019). In
many institutions, the lack of a systematic approach as well as a high turnover of research-
ers with temporary contracts makes it difficult to establish and maintain a culture of ethics.
We now examine how scientists can be classified after they have become aware of the exist-
ence of ethical issues.
Golem-makers
Although it may lead to raising their awareness, training in research ethics does not
provide a guarantee that every scientist will become actively engaged in ethical thinking.
Some researchers will remain largely indifferent: they know but do not care, or do not care
enough. We call these scientists golem-makers. The golem legends are often employed in
the discussions of potential risks associated with technological progress (Collins and Pinch
1998, 2002; Sherwin 2009; Grinbaum 2010).
The golems are legendary artificial creatures made by several rabbis as a demonstration
of their knowledge and power. In the best known version, rabbi Loew of Prague success-
fully built a golem in order to protect the Jewish community of that city. This narrative is
very unusual: other, much older golems were not built with a specific purpose in mind. In
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one legend, prophet Jeremiah succeeds in building a perfect human-like golem, which is
also able to speak. As it talks to Jeremiah, the golem warns him about the confusion he had
brought unto the world: ‘When a man meets another man in the street, he will not know
whether you made them or God made them’ (Atlan 2010). Jeremiah is portrayed as a man
of immense knowledge and wisdom, who felt the urge to demonstrate his knowledge in
practice: he builds a golem because he can do it. However, he fails to envisage an
ethical problem raised by his creative activity. Like Jeremiah, golem-making scientists
seek above all to obtain new knowledge; they are so overwhelmed by the enthusiasm of
makers that they forget to take the time to reflect on ethics.
The main difference between heroic scientists and golem-makers is that, morally speak-
ing, the former are simpletons, while the latter are not moral ignoramuses: they can think
about ethics, but they do not. Ethically unaware heroic scientists may become golem-
makers even as a result of training in ethics: awareness does not automatically lead to
active engagement with ethical thinking. This is maintained by one of the respondents
at the University of Queensland:
I think people are more aware of [the ethical problems in science], there is certainly more
emphasis from the funding agencies, but in terms of how people naturally think about
things or broader conversations on campus about what does it mean to be an ethical
researcher? I don’t think we have those conversations. (Sehic and Ashworth 2018)
Golem-makers are more commonly found in the cutting-edge fields of research, e.g. syn-
thetic biology, in which they feel a strong pressure to produce innovative results in the near
future. Researchers at the Biodesign Institute at Arizona State University (ASU) seem to
exemplify this attitude:
Researchers at the Biodesign Institute are described by one interviewee as understanding ASU
to be the ‘wild west of science, [and] that they could do things here that they weren’t permitted
to do anyplace else’. Accordingly, a tagline used for communicating the culture of the Institute
is “the official home of the ‘why not?’” This implies an intentional eschewing of popular norms
and limits to scientific research. Of course, the ‘wild west’ was not a terribly ethical place by
today’s standards, but that reality does not come through as part of the institutional culture
of pushing boundaries and transforming the world. Published promotional materials express
a similar cultural value, declaring, “this is a no holds barred culture, where curiosity and crea-
tivity are on overdrive”. (Grinbaum and Politi 2019; see also Doezema and Guston 2018)
However, while some regard their field of research as a sort of wild territory to be explored
with a ‘why not?’ attitude, the Biodesign Institute itself promotes a different image. As
stated on its website, the research conducted at the Biodesign Institute appears to be
embedded in, and driven by, ethical principles: all the core objectives are directed at
social well-being. Despite these statements at the collective level, many individual
members of the Institute resemble golem-makers.
At other organizations, institutional culture does play a more significant role. In fact, it
sometimes helps to reinforce the golem-makers’ attitude of indifference. This is the case in
RRI-Practice studies in which it has been revealed that ethics is believed to be a ‘brake’
impeding the development of science and technology, rather than its ‘steering wheel’. If
an organization takes ethics to be in deep conflict with innovation, then it will not be
regarded as anything more than a matter of compliance with laws and regulations. The
golem-making attitude is pervasive in such an environment.
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Our judgment on golem-makers is however far from negative. One of the main motiv-
ations for pursuing a scientific career is enthusiasm and curiosity. Even after a training in
ethics, the majority of scientists will follow these values rather than be converted into phi-
losophers or social thinkers. This is a fundamental hierarchy of values, which we observe
in the RRI-Practice studies and do not attempt to criticize. Institutional culture may be a
consequence, not a cause, of this hierarchy. At the same time, such an institutional culture
provides negative feedback to the members of the organization by reinforcing their disin-
terest in ethics. This thorny relation between the collective and the individual is crucial to
understanding the concept of ethical labor.
Prometheans
There are scientists who place a higher interest, e.g. that of humanity, of a nation or of a
religion, above the pursuit of knowledge. For them, good science must be morally good: it
should serve the interests of non-scientists and contribute to their flourishing and well-
being. We call these scientists Prometheans.
In ancient Greek mythology, Prometheus is a Titan who steals fire from the gods and
gives it to the mortals. By doing so, he incurs the rage of Zeus, who decides to punish him.
Many interpretations of the myth focus on its ‘political’ aspects, e.g. Prometheus chal-
lenges the authority of Zeus in an act of social rebellion. In other interpretations, his
behavior would not be very different from that of the golem-makers: Prometheus does
something spectacular in a risky and thoughtless way, just because he can. In this
interpretation, the myth of Prometheus would be yet another cautionary tale about the
unintended consequences of innovation.
Here we follow here a different interpretation. A golem ought not to be released or
made free to the public; by contrast, fire is given to humans who own it and use it as
they please. The rage of the gods against Prometheus has nothing to do with the well-
being obtained by the mortals through the possession of fire but depends solely on phtho-
nos, jealousy of the gods, which in turn is connected with koros, the idea that men will
perform better than the gods themselves (Grinbaum and Groves 2013). In this regard, Pro-
metheus, like Ulysses later on, acts on his philotimia, the love of great achievements, and
the myth can be used to describe moral ambiguity necessary to achieve technological
progress.
The figure of Prometheus is morally ambiguous in many ways. Bachelard claims that
‘the Prometheus complex is the Oedipus complex of the life of the intellect’ (Bachelard
1964). Although Prometheus could be portrayed as a champion of humankind, he
could also have tricked and challenged Zeus as a mere display of his own ingenuity. His
psyche remains a mixture of various feelings. Similarly, at a close inspection, Promethean
scientists may be driven by personal ambition, the desire of recognition, prestige or career
advancement as much as other scientists are. This is a matter of psychology; that ethics can
be reduced to psychology is a controversial stance which we do not intend to discuss here.
It would be enough to point out that, even assuming that a scientist is driven by selfish
reasons or mundane desires, she becomes a Promethean on the basis of how she
decides to act upon her desires. In other words, if a scientist aims at obtaining success
and recognition by taking the road of progress and human flourishing, then she is a Pro-
methean irrespective of her personal desires.
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Promethean scientists should be distinguished from another figure described in the RRI
literature: the so-called ‘RRI champions’ (Wittrock and Forsberg 2019). These are individ-
uals who champion responsible research and innovation and have the power to change
their organization. They are different from Promethean scientists in two respects.
Firstly, RRI is said to contain five keys: ethics, science education, open access, social
engagement and gender equality. While an RRI champion is expected to care about all
five, we characterize scientists solely on the basis of their ethical thinking. Secondly,
RRI champions found in research-performing and research-funding organizations may
not be scientists at all but high-level managers. It is worth noticing, however, that the
focus in both cases is on individuals:
The discussion of the role of impactful individuals in innovation and development goes back
to early literature on the topic, and the consensus has fluctuated as a pendulum between
giving such individuals much weight, to seeing innovation and change efforts as predomi-
nantly a communal enterprise. (Wittrock and Forsberg 2019)
The tension between this individual focus and the collective ethical labor will be dis-
cussed below.
Faustian scientists
Certain scientists may lean towards immorality: scientific research is beyond good and
evil, or perhaps there are no such things as ‘good’ and ‘evil’. Like Prometheans, they are
driven by ambition and desire; but in their case the desire to be the first in their profession
is particularly strong. What makes them different is that, even though they know that the
price of their actions could be very high, they continue to pursue their work with whatever
means they have at their disposal. Potential costs to be incurred later do not matter. They
have deliberately dismissed the necessity and the importance of ethical thinking. We call
such scientists Faustian. In the German legends and in literature, Faust is a knowledgeable,
apparently successful but dissatisfied intellectual, who goes as far as to sell his soul to the
Devil in exchange for unlimited knowledge and power. Faust’s readiness to break moral
codes has made him a symbol of overambitious and ruthless intellectual.
Faustian scientists are the only category not to be found in the empirical data collected
by the RRI-Practice project. No immoral scientist would normally be willing to publicly
disclose their own inclinations. A Faustian scientist, therefore, may be compared to the
man who found the legendary ring of Gyges, as recounted by Glaucon in Plato’s Republic.
Glaucon’s claim is that whoever had the fortune of finding the charmed ring, which grants
the gift of invisibility, would start abusing its power. Glaucon explains: there is nothing
inherently ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in the world, and ethics is only a social convention. Whoever
has a chance of escaping the judgment would behave without consideration for the socially
constructed moral codes:
Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and the
unjust the other; no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand
fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely
take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with any one at his pleasure, or
kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a god among men. Then
the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would both come at last to
the same point. (Plato, Republic, 360b–d)
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Faustian scientists seem to believe that if ‘invisibility’ were granted to other scientists, they
too would behave immorally. In other words, they do not believe in scientific integrity:
from their perspective, deep inside themselves every scientist is immoral. As the Comedian
says in the Prelude of Goethe’s Faust: ‘Aman sees in the world what he carries in his heart’
(Goethe [1808] 1851).
This belief in hidden immorality of all scientists may further drive the ambition and the
desire of the Faustians to ‘get there first’. If a scandal does occur and they are found out,
they would merely believe that they were unlucky. Like the possessor of the magic ring of
Gyges, they may move on with their research in unethical ways as long as they feel they
have the power to go ‘invisible’. The occurrence of a scandal may be a deterrent but
will hardly change their moral stance.
Faustian scientists, therefore, pose a methodological problem: it is very difficult to
recognize them or to count their number. That a scientist is immoral, in fact, is often
understood only after a scandal has occurred. And scandals of this sort do occur: real
cases provide sufficient evidence for our argument, even though we have not found any
self-proclaimed Faustian scientists among the participants to the RRI-Practice project.
A recent example is He Jiankui, a Chinese researcher who announced in November
2018 that he had used a gene editing technique known as CRISPR-Cas9 to alter the
genetic make-up of two twin girls, in order to disable the genetic pathway that the HIV
virus uses to infect cells (Larson 2018). He Jiankui has innovated in biotechnology but
he also violated the ‘soft laws’ of scientific conduct and was jailed for three years for
‘seeking fame and wealth’ (Farrer 2019). He has become a celebrity but his work has
caused worldwide indignation and significant reputational damage to his country and
institution.
At this point, there is a significant problem. On the one hand, Promethean fire-bestow-
ers crave, too, for prestige and recognition: as Oedipus, they may want to ‘kill their fathers’
and gain power, but they choose to do so by investing in projects oriented towards doing
good. On the other hand, it cannot be excluded that the results of the Faustian scientists
will turn out to be beneficial years later: ruthless desires and immoral conduct may lead to
progress in knowledge or technology after all. Ironically, although in the distribution of
ethical labor in science they occupy the opposite sides of the spectrum, Promethean
and Faustian models cannot always be told apart in real individuals. This is so because
immoral scientists may display good intentions and describe themselves as working for
the good of society, e.g. giving progeny to people with HIV. If one day the work of He
Jiankui is considered useful and beneficial, a Faustian scientist will turn out to have
behaved morally. This is a consequentialist perspective. At present, however, we are con-
cerned with a virtue ethics categorization.
Ethics in science: taking stock of the agents of science
Within the scientific community, different types of scientists may have different systems of
ethical values. Considering the agents of science reveals a vast middle ground between the
extremes of the ‘value-free’ and the ‘value-laden’ ideals. To conclude our classification, we
emphasize in this section the key characteristics that separate the categories.
Heroic scientists endorse the so-called value-free ideal. In their view, science and ethics
are completely separated: they are concerned only with the former, never with the latter.
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Golem-makers, by contrast, do not necessarily think that science and ethics are completely
separated. They believe, however, that the pursuit of scientific truth always corresponds to
the pursuit of the highest good. In other words, doing scientific research corresponds to
doing something good for society. While heroic scientists regard epistemological and
ethical problems as completely separated, golem-makers regard ethical problems as
being exhausted and resolved within the epistemic and scientific sphere.
Promethean scientists are closer to Douglas’s ideal of a responsible scientist: they incor-
porate ethical reflection in their research activity. Faustian scientists, by contrast, do not
even believe in the possibility of ethical issues: they are immoral in the sense that they
place themselves beyond good and evil or, perhaps, for them there is no good or evil.
While Faustian scientists, if and when they are found out, should be punished, con-
structive ethical labor in the scientific community is distributed among golem-makers
and Prometheans. However, we contend that a realistic approach towards the institutio-
nalization of ethics in science should take into account the existence, not just of these
two types, but of all four.
Describing ethical thinking within the scientific community:
methodological challenges and future prospects
As noted, our classification is grounded in the trove of empirical data collected in the
project ‘Responsible Research and Innovation in Practice’ (RRI-Practice). An important
specification is here in order. The RRI-Practice organizational studies consisted in a
series of semi-structured interviews of researchers, managers, and policy-makers at
various levels. These interviews were part of larger studies, which also involved the analysis
of relevant documents, strategy reports, organizational policies, annual reports, mission
statements, and regulations such as codes of conduct. The resulting national reports
contain a wealth of information but they do not necessarily provide a complete represen-
tation of the structure of the scientific community. Our classification, in fact, is an ideal-
ization extrapolated from the empirical data. Such an idealization is not problematic for at
least two reasons.
First, our classification is as much an idealization as are those models that take every
scientist to be engaged in ethical thinking at all times. Rudner and Douglas submit that
every scientist qua scientist makes value judgments, but we submit that this claim is
more of a normative statement than an empirical observation. By contrast, we do use
empirical findings in our classification, although we too cannot avoid an element of
idealization.
Second, our model is not a greater idealization than the ones present in most models of
the distribution of cognitive labor. For example, Weisberg and Muldoon’s ‘mavericks’ and
‘followers’ can hardly be really found in an actual scientific community, since at different
stages of career or research activity each scientist may embody traits of both types. More-
over, talking about ‘the’ scientific community is already an idealization: depending on the
field of research, from pure mathematics to high-energy physics or biologists working at
Antarctic outposts, the group structure may vary very significantly. Idealization in itself is
not an insurmountable methodological problem: the models of the distribution of cogni-
tive labor are considered to be useful starting points for understanding how science
accomplishes its epistemic aims. Similarly, the idealized classification we provide should
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be seen as an invitation to consider how individual variations in ethical thinking may lead
to responsible science at the collective level.
In other words, heroic scientists, golem-makers, Promethean and Faustian scientists are
to be considered as Weberian ‘ideal-types’. For MaxWeber, who was heavily influenced by
Kant’s study of the pure categories of human reason, social reality cannot be described by
exhaustive models capturing all of its aspects: such models, necessarily highly complex,
would not lead to any progress in the understanding of society. Weber proposed to
make abstract and purified models which are, on the one hand, grounded in empirical
data and, on the other, capable of explaining them. In Weber’s view, such abstract
models should employ what he called ‘ideal types’:
An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by
the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent
concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly empha-
sized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct […] In its conceptual purity, this mental
construct […] cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. (Weber 1903–1917/1949)
Ideal types arise from the inspiration of empirical data, but they are never to be fully
instantiated in reality: one has to ‘elevate’ themselves from the empirical level.
A further issue makes the comparison between cognitive labor and ethical labor proble-
matic. While scientists are often eager to talk about their discoveries and scientific conun-
drums, they can be reluctant to speak about ethics in public or even among peers (Wolpe
2006). They may refrain from doing so because of the lack of proper philosophical training
or due to a conviction that science has little to do with ethics. Some scientists believe that
reflection on the ethical aspects of science is not a part of their professional obligations.
Not speaking about ethics in public does not imply that no researchers reflect on the
ethical issues surrounding their professional activity: most scientists in our classification
are not morally blind.
The chasm between what scientists declare in public (or what they stay silent about)
and what they actually think poses at least two problems. Firstly, as already mentioned,
some individuals may be difficult to recognize as belonging to a particular category. Sec-
ondly, scientists in general are not used to talking explicitly about the ethical standpoints
that they endorse. Ethical norms governing a scientific community may often be implicit
and difficult to discern and to evaluate. In short, what many scientists outside the heroic
category may lack is not a rudimentary capacity for ethical reflection per se—i.e. the
activity of thinking about the ethical dimensions of their work—but the habit of explicat-
ing and publicly discussing their ethical standpoints and intuitions. In the absence of such
a habit, scientists’ ethical thinking may remain unclear or confusing even to themselves.
This issue has already been discussed by Kempner, Perils, and Merz (2005), who inter-
viewed forty US-based scientists working in various biological and biomedical disciplines.
They report that scientific research is slowed down and limited, not only by formal con-
straints, such as governmental policies or codes of conduct, but also by informal con-
straints, which tacitly forbid scientists from engaging in research that has the potential
to spark moral outrage:
Respondents at once decried external regulation and recognized the right of society to place
limits on what and how science is done. They stated that scientists are “moral” and “respon-
sible,” but acknowledged cases in which scientists were sanctioned for acting outside the
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mainstream of their disciplines. They also said that, although information and “truth” had
inherent utility, full and open publication was not always possible. Whereas most respon-
dents worked hard to avoid controversy, others relished it. (Kempner, Perils, and Merz 2005)
Empirical evidence, including the findings of the RRI-Practice project, shows that some
scientists are engaged in ethical reflection, albeit in an implicit and rudimentary way. In
this way, it suggests that a view which is still very popular among many philosophers,
and which can be summarized by Heidegger’s well-known maxim ‘science does not
think’ taken simplistically at face value (Heidegger 1968), is wrong. However, science per-
forming ethical labor at the collective level does not imply that each individual scientist is,
or should be, involved in ethical thinking in equal measure. Some philosophers believe that
science was solely devoted to the procedural mechanics of making: it was ‘thoughtless’
(Arendt 1981) because it did not seem philosophical or political enough. By contrast,
we find that scientists of particular types do think about the potential impacts of their
research on society. Some scientists, but not all, ‘walk the walk’ even if they do not ‘talk
the talk’. That only a fraction of scientists does so, and that the structure of ethical
labor need not imply its universal appeal for each individual researcher, needs to be
both better studied empirically and better conceptualized philosophically in the future.
Ethics in science: descriptions to prescriptions
Although our classification describes the current landscape of scientific research, our aims
are not sociological or merely descriptive. We also wish to provide a normative contri-
bution to the ongoing discussion about the institutionalization of ethics in science. To
be viable, however, prescriptions must take the current state of affairs into consideration.
As Cartwright and Hardy (2012) explain, policy-makers must always keep in mind that
what has worked ‘here’ will not necessarily work ‘there’. This is because contextual factors
may hinder the success of newly developed policies. Understanding the social and cultural
settings, including people’s agency and values, is necessary for the implementation of suc-
cessful policies. This is why a failure to consider the actual agents of science, their values,
and the degree of their engagement with ethical thinking could lead to serious problems in
the institutionalization of ethical reflection.
Many researchers fear that what is marked as ‘ethics’ within the new science policy fra-
meworks is nothing more than yet another bureaucratic hurdle imposed in a top-down
fashion. Another risk is that the agents for whom the policy is designed may not wish
to engage with a policy labelled as ‘new’ and susceptible of changing the status quo.
This inertia, a resistance-by-default mechanism, makes ethical thinking an institutional
challenge. Reducing ethics to ‘ticking the boxes’ does not encourage deep reflection and
may not be sufficient to overcome these barriers.
Some organizations in the RRI-Practice project established research units to carry out
ethical reflection (Grinbaum and Politi 2019). While the absence of such dedicated units
does not necessarily imply the absence of concerned scientists at an institution, their pres-
ence does not guarantee that ethics will actually be reflected upon, or even acknowledged,
by the scientists doing laboratory work. There is a risk that the ethics of science will
become a specialized occupation in its own right. This delegation of ethical labor is a
serious institutional gaffe: as a consequence, individual ethical reflection might be dimin-
ished or dismissed altogether, either through the reduction of ethics to a bureaucratic
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exercise or its transfer into the hands of a few specialists. We suggest, therefore, that the
institutionalization of ethics in science should come from within the scientific community
itself, and not be delegated to external specialists. The expertise of philosophers or social
scientists is a welcome addition to, not a replacement of, the scientists’ and the engineers’
own ethical thinking.
Our classification distinguishes scientists who are not engaged in ethical reflection from
the ones that are. It may still be claimed that an ideal scientific community should contain
a strong prevalence of Prometheans over the other types of scientists. In our view, this
cannot be but one side of the whole picture. Surely Prometheans are needed. However,
the fact that they may remain a minority is not problematic in principle, since it does
not appear necessary that every individual scientist be equally engaged in ethical reflection
for science as an institution to be collectively responsible. Ethical diversity of types, like the
diversity of the types of cognitive labor, is both realistic and regulative in the community.
Nevertheless, measures should be taken to permit Prometheans to express their ethical
expertise without other scientists posing obstacles to them.
Clearly, Faustian scientists are not socially acceptable in the scientific community. Their
elimination is a matter of disciplinary procedures, if not jurisprudence. Heroic and golem-
maker scientists, however, are not purely evil from the society’s point of view. They pursue
different values: their value hierarchy is different but it can be morally justified as well. For
them, the aims of science are epistemic.
The cognitive labor of scientists is heavy and time-consuming and, as the models of its
distribution across the scientific community show, it requires a coordinated effort of
different types of individuals, each possessing different skills and competences. It is
often the case that the most groundbreaking discoveries and advancements in science
are made by a few individuals, while the majority is engaged in the equally important
tasks of confirming and applying new theories. As with the division of cognitive labor,
it may even also be the case that responsible science should rely on a minority of reflecting
individuals, who carry out ethical labor, while the others are left to the heroic stance.
Rather than being negatively criticized a priori, this heterogeneity deserves to be under-
stood and analysed: it may turn out that, for science to be collectively engaged in
ethical labor, not every single member of the scientific community needs to engage in
ethical thinking in the same way. Only further analyses will reveal whether and how
ethical labor, similarly to cognitive labor, should be distributed across the individual
members of the scientific community for science to be collectively responsible.
To conclude, we suggest that the institutionalization of ethics in science should appreci-
ate the ethical expertise of Promethean scientists without trying to make every single
scientist a Promethean. Allowing Prometheans to display their belonging to this category,
understanding how they engage in ethical thinking, and enabling them to make their own
ethical thinking explicit and public may be crucial for overcoming the barriers to the insti-
tutionalization of ethics in science.
Notes
1. For an introduction to ELSI on the example of genomics, see https://www.genome.gov/
10001754/elsi-planning-and-evaluation-history; for some discussions, see Balmer et al.
(2016), Fisher (2005).
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2. For an introduction and some discussions about TA see, among the others, Grunwald (1999,
2018), Rip, Misa, and Schot (1995), Schot and Rip (1997).
3. https://www.rri-tools.eu
4. E.g. a form of political collective responsibility identified as ‘being held responsible for some-
thing one has not done’. For further discussion, see Grinbaum and Groves (2013).
5. Funded by the Horizon-2020 programme of the European Commission under grant agree-
ment 709637. The project analyzed the barriers and drivers to successful implementation of
RRI both in the European context and internationally, promoting reflection on organis-
ational structures and cultures of research-performing and research-funding organisations,
identifying and supporting best practices to facilitate the uptake of RRI. It had participants
from twelve EU and non-EU countries: Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, France,
Germany, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, UK, and USA. The deliverables of the
project include a set of organizational studies on how the five RRI ‘keys’ of ethics, science
education, open access, gender equality, and societal engagement are perceived, conceptual-
ized, and enacted within current organisational practices and cultures as well as a set of com-
parative reports across nations. In this article, we draw from these national case studies as
well as from the comparative report on the RRI key of ethics. All the national case-studies
produced in the RRI-Practice project, as well as the comparative analyses on each of the
RRI-keys, are available at https://www.rri-practice.eu/publications-and-deliverables/.
6. For some recent discussions about the value-free and value-laden ideals of science see, among
the others, Kincaid, Dupré, and Wylie (2007); Douglas (2009); Elliott (2017).
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